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SCHOOL LAW: A SURVEY OF EDUCATORS
Earl J. Ogletree and
Nancy Lewis*
INTRODUCTION
Today's schools function in a complex and ever-changing legal environ-
ment. Educators and students possess rights that are protected by both
federal and state constitutions. State and federal judicial decisions have had
far-reaching impact in defining the constitutional rights of students and
teachers in the areas of freedom of speech,' freedom of religion, 2 due
process,3 and equal protection.4 The rapidly growing number of state and
federal court decisions,' combined with legislative enactments, executive
orders, and rules implemented by regulatory agencies, leave educators in a
complicated morass of legal "do's and don'ts."
Educators need to have an understanding of school law as it affects their
duties and responsibilities, careers, students and the institutions in which
they work. Without such knowledge, administrators and teachers may find
themselves making decisions which result in a lawsuit against them. Educators
do not need to become lawyers or experts in school law, but they should be
prepared to recognize litigious situations and understand how to protect their
rights, as well as the rights of their students. Hence administrators and
teachers alike ned to maintain a current understanding of legal changes that
affect the schools.
There is a need to know the extent of educators' knowledge about pertinent
issues in school law. This article presents the results of a survey administered
to educators in Illinois which attempted to measure their knowlege of school
law. The survey centered on four major areas of school law: 1) constitutional
issues; 2) Illinois law; 3) student and parental rights; and 4) teacher rights.
This survey will aid in determining the areas where educators' knowledge of
school law is lacking, and serve as a basis for the effective formulation of
* Earl J. Ogletree, B.A., Chicago Teachers College; M.A., University of Chicago; D.Ed.,
Wayne State University. Professor Ogletree is on the faculty of the Department of Education
at Chicago State University.
Nancy Lewis, B.A., M.Ed., Northern Illinois University. Ms. Lewis is Instructional Co-
ordinator at Manley High School in Chicago.
I. See infra notes 114-66, 227-56 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 6-49 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 97-108, 167-80 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 52-65, 201-16, 219-25 and accompanying text.
5. Lawsuits brought against educators have increased to between 1,500 and 3,000 annually.
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school administration and teacher education programs to remedy the situa-
tion.
I1. METHODOLOGY
To determine the extent of educators' knowledge of school law, the
researchers surveyed 200 educators, of whom 50 were administrators and
150 were teachers. The sample group was administered a 100-item question-
naire covering Illinois school statutes, and state and federal case law in the
areas of student rights, teacher rights, tort liability, church-state relations,
and civil rights. The results were analyzed in terms of degrees held, years of
experience, position, and school law class enrollment, using cross tabulations
and the Chi-Square to determine the statistical significance (.05) of the
responses.
III. SURVEY RESULTS
A. Constitutional Issues
1. Church-State Relations
The free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment require
the separation of church and state. 6 The courts have played a major role in
defining and enforcing these constitutional provisions as they apply to ed-
ucational issues. The cases dealing with the relationship between religion and
education divide into two categories: 1) those involving public aid to sectarian
education institutions;7 and 2) those dealing with the imposition of religion
within the public schools.8 The survey of educators covered both of these
areas .9
Attempts to provide state aid to sectarian institutions take many forms.",
In determining the permissibility of such measures under the establishment
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Illinois Constitution also prohibits the
expenditure of money for sectarian purposes. ILL. CONST. art. 10 § 3.
7. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1941) (payments for bus transpor-
tation); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (direct loan of textbooks); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (state funds to supply standardized tests and scoring).
8. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1981) (posting copy of Ten Commandments
in classrooms); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible
reading in schools); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (release time from
public education for religious education); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School
Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d I, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (4th Dist.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977)
(religious clubs on campus).
9. See Appendix, Table I, (A)-(H).
10. See, e.g., Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (struck down direct money grants from the State to nonpublic schools for maintenance
and repair of school facilities, as well as provisions for vouchers and tax credits to parents);
Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upheld
reimbursement of sectarian institutions from public funds for testing required by state law);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upheld state provision of textbooks to nonpublic
schools).
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clause, the courts utilize a three-prong test: 1) whether the purpose of the
legislation is secular; 2) whether the legislation has a primary secular effect;
and 3) whether the act will involve excessive entanglement between church
and state." In Everson v. Board of Education, " the Supreme Court held
that the payment of bus fares for parochial school pupils as part of a general
transportation program did not violate the first amendment. The payments
applied to all school pupils, and thus the legislation had neither a nonsecular
purpose nor effect. Further, there was no excessive government entanglement
with religion since payments were made to the parents and not to the church. 'I
When asked whether public schools may provide free transportation to non-
public schools, only forty-seven percent of the total sample responded cor-
rectly.' 4 Administrators fared less well than teachers; only forty-four percent
answered correctly compared to forty-nine percent of the teachers. In this
instance a school law class made a significant difference in the educators'
awareness of the Everson case. 6
Additionally, the survey sample was asked whether tax-exemptions for
non-profit sectarian schools are constitutional. More than half of the edu-
cators responded correctly." Such exemptions were found constitutional in
Walz v. Tax Commission,' 8 which upheld a New York statute exempting
religious institutions from property taxes. Level of education, years of
experience, and taking a school law class all showed a marked influence on
the number of correct responses.'
II. Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773. See
generally Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
260 (1968); Duffy, A Review of Supreme Court Decisions on Aid to Nonpublic Elementary
and Secondary Education, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 966 (1972).
12. 330 U.S. 1 (1941).
13. Id. The Court further reasoned that the bus fare program was analogous to the provision
of other services such as police and fire protection to the schools.
14. See Appendix, Table I, (B).
15. Id. Ironically, those with bachelors degrees also scored better (fifty-two percent) than
those with masters degrees (forty-two percent). Those with little teaching experience had more
correct responses than those with more experience. Those with five or less years scored fifty-
three percent correct responses; six to ten years, forty-eight percent correct; eleven or more
years, forty-five percent correct.
16. Sixty percent of those with a school law class answered correctly compared with thirty-
five percent of those without a course.
17. Sixty-five percent of the total surveyed responded correctly.
18. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). It should be noted, however, that the the constitutionality of
Section 17C of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows taxpayer deductions for contributions
to charitable organizations including religious institutions, has not been decided. Cf. Committee
for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tuition grant and tax
benefit programs for parents of parochial school students unconstitutional and distinguishable
from tax exemptions to similar institutions).
19. Sixty-three percent of those with a bachelors degree answered correctly, compared to
sixty-seven percent with a masters degree. Eighty-five percent of the administrators answered
correctly, compared to only sixty-one percent of the teachers. Seventy percent of those who
had taken a school law class responded correctly, compared to sixty-three percent of those who
had not taken a course. See Appendix, Table I, (A).
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The second category of questions regarding church-state relations focuses
on religious activities within the schools. The inquiries in this part of the
survey test educators' knowledge about the extent to which secular activities
in the school may interfere with students' religious beliefs and practices,2"
as well as the extent to which religion may be brought into the schools. 2'
Educators exhibited a keen awareness of the extent to which secular
activities may intrude upon the student's religious beliefs. 22 In West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,2 3 Jehovah's Witnesses brought an
action challenging the constitutionality of a Virginia regulation requiring all
teachers and students to salute the flag. 24 The Supreme Court held such
action unconstitutional. 21 The vast majority of educators in all categories
were familiar with the prohibition against forcing a student to salute the
flag.26 Likewise, most educators knew that female students could not be
penalized for refusing on religious grounds to wear gym suits for physical
education classes. 27 Once again, years of experience influenced the re-
sponses,2" but the most significant factor in eliciting correct responses was
20. See Appendix, Table I, (C) (mandatory flag salutes) and (E) (wearing gym suits).
21. See Appendix, Table I, (D) (posting Ten Commandments in classroom); (F) (religious
groups on campus); (G) (transcendental meditation as a course offering).
22. See Appendix, Table 1, (C) and (E).
23. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
24. Plaintiffs alleged that compliance with this provision violated their religious beliefs since
it was equivalent to worshipping "a graven image." 319 U.S. at 629.
25. Id. The Court stressed that to hold otherwise would "invade the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our constitution to reserve from all
official control." 319 U.S. at 629.
26. See Appendix, Table 1, (C). Ninety percent of all educators responded correctly. The
most significant factor in the educators' responses was years of experience, as exhibited by
fourteen percent more correct answers for educators with six to ten years experience compared
to those with only five or less years experience. A school law class had little effect in this
instance, since there is only a five percent difference in the number of correct answers between
those with a class and those without.
27. Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. 111. 1979). Members of the United Pentecostal
Church challenged a state requirement for co-educational gym classes on the basis that "im-
modest apparel" worn during the classes violated their religious beliefs. The district court ruled
that a deeply-held religious conviction existed that was in conflict with the state's requirement
of compulsory attendance of co-educational physical education classes. The court concluded
that although the state had a valid interest in providing school-age children with daily physical
education classes, it had not chosen the least restrictive alternative to achieve its goal. Id. at
277. But see Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982) (Orthodox
Jewish basketball players had no constitutional right to wear yarmulkes while playing); Hatch
v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974) (American Indian students were not exempt from
school's regulation concerning hair length even though their hair style was based on religious
beliefs).
28. Years of experience made a significant difference. Educators with five or less years of
experience scored seventy-nine percent correct answers, and those with six to ten years scored
eighty-nine percent. Surprisingly, the number of correct responses declined nine percent for
those with eleven or more years of experience. See Appendix, Table I, (E).
[Vol. 35:259
SCHOOL LA W
having had a school law class, since twenty percent more of those educators
answered correctly. 29
On the whole, educators had mixed responses to questions on the issue of
bringing religion into the schools." A school law course significantly im-
proved the number of correct responses." However, all educators displayed
consistent knowledge of constitutional limitations governing the display of
the Ten Commandments in the classroom. In Stone v. Graham, 2 the Supreme
Court struck down a Kentucky statute that required the posting of a copy
of the Ten Commandments on the wall of every public school classroom.
The Court found that the primary purpose of the requirement was religious
in nature, and thus the postings violated the establishment clause. Of the
educators surveyed, eighty-seven percent were aware that such a display of
the Ten Commandments in the classroom was unconstitutional. 3 In this
instance taking a school law course did not increase the number of correct
responses. "I
Although the display of religious texts in public school classrooms is
prohibited, the right of religious groups to utilize school classrooms is not
certain. In Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School District,"
the California appellate court upheld the school district's refusal to allow
a student religious club to meet in school classrooms during school hours.
The court reasoned that recognition of the club would have a primary
effect of promoting religion. Further, the appointment of a faculty sponsor
would create an impermissible entanglement of state and religion.36 More
recently, however, the Supreme Court, in Widmar v. Vincent," held that
registered religious student groups were entitled to equal access to facilities
at a state university. 8 The majority of educators believed that religious
29. Ninety-four percent of those with a school law class answered correctly, compared to
only seventy-four percent of those without. Only eighty-two percent of the total sample gave
the correct response. See Appendix, Table 1, (E).
30. See Appendix, Table 1, (D), (F)-(H). The difference in response level may, in part, be
accounted for by the difference between questions concerned with "pure religion" and those
concerning areas in which educators must first discern if religious beliefs are involved at all.
31. See Appendix, Table I, (F)-(H).
32. 499 U.S. 39 (1981).
33. See Appendix, Table 1, (D). Eighty-six percent of those with a bachelors degree and
eighty-eight percent of those with a masters degree answered correctly. Inexperienced teachers
more often answered correctly: five or less years-ninety percent; six to ten years-eighty-seven
percent; eleven or more years-eighty-seven percent. There was little difference between the
answers given by administrators, eighty-eight percent, and teachers, eighty-seven percent.
34. See Appendix, Table 1, (D). Eighty-five percent of those with a school law class answered
correctly, while ironically, eighty-eight percent of those without a course responded correctly.
35. 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (4th Dist.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
36. Id. at 14, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
37. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
38. It should be noted that Widmar applied narrowly to students' rights at the university
level. A more restrictive holding may apply to lower educational levels. See also Note, Access
to Public School Facilities and Students by Outsiders, 16 ScH. L. BULL. 9 (1985); Sendor,
Congress v. the Courts: Extracurricular Religious Groups, 16 SCH. L. BULL. 1 (1985).
19851
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
groups could be denied recognition and excluded from the classroom."
In some instances, it is not as clear whether the state is acting in a manner
that will impermissibly introduce religion into the schools. For example, the
survey posed the question of whether transcendental meditation was permit-
ted in schools.4" In Malnak v. Yogi, 41 New Jersey schools offered an elective
course entitled Science of Creative Intelligence/Transcendental Meditation.
The court held that for purposes of the first amendment, the teaching of
SCI/TM technique advanced a religious concept and therefore could not be
taught in the public schools."2 The majority of educators, sixty-two percent,
responded correctly.4 3 A school law class significantly affected these results,
with seventy-one percent who had had a school law class responding that
transcendental meditation was not allowed in public schools, compared with
only forty-six percent who had not had a law class."
While the state may not act with a purpose or effect of introducing religion
into the schools, it is also prohibited from establishing a "religion of
secularism" by opposing or showing hostility toward religion. In Abington
School District v. Schemp,"4 the Supreme Court struck down legislation
requiring that each day begin with readings from the Bible. However, the
Court emphasized the need for neutrality by the state in relations between
religious believers and non-believers, and concluded that the study of the
Bible or religion would be permissible when presented "objectively as part
of a secular program of education. ' 46 Fifty-seven percent of all educators
responded no when asked if religion must be completely excluded from the
schools.4 Administrators fared the best on this question with sixty-three
percent responding correctly. 4 Educators without a school law class exhibited
the lowest score of forty-one percent. 49
Survey results on questions concerning church-state relations show that in
most instances, a school law class produced better-informed teachers in this
39. Sixty-two percent of the total sample responded that student religious groups were not
entitled to recognition by a public school. The split among the school law class category was
particularly marked; seventy-three percent of those with a class answered no recognition,
compared to only forty-four percent of those without a class. See Appendix, Table I, (F).
40. See Appendix, Table I, (G).
41. 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.C.N.J. 1977).
42. The court specifically relied on references in the course text to a "supreme being" and
use of the "puja chant" in its determination that SCI/TM was a religious concept. Id. at 1322-
23.
43. See Appendix, Table I, (G).
44. Id.
45. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
46. id. at 225.
47. See Appendix, Table I, (H).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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area."' Additionally, experience was an important factor in the educators'
degree of knowledge. Those teachers with six to ten years of experience
tended to exhibit the highest degree of understanding, indicating the need
for more initial training of newer teachers and refresher courses for teachers
with eleven or more years of experience.'
2. Desegregation
The second category of constitutional questions concerns the role of
desegregation in ensuring that all students have an opportunity for an equal
education. The notion of "separate but equal" schools was abandoned in
Brown v. Board of Education,5 2 where the Court held that "[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." 5 The major area of contro-
versy concerning desegregation in the schools today, however, focuses on
the nature and extent of a suitable remedy.14 A number of questions con-
cerning remedies for desegregation were posed to the survey sample. The
sample responses exhibited a lack of understanding of this issue.
Neither teachers nor administrators were absolutely certain whether met-
ropolitan desegregation plans are favored over in-city desegregation plans. 5
In Milliken v. Bradley,5 6 the Court ruled that a remedy mandating cross-
district or interdistrict consolidation to rectify a condition of segregation in
only one school district was invalid, since the outlying districts were not
charged with any significant violations of de jure segregation. Survey re-
sponses on this issue exemplify extreme confusion. In only two categories
did the educators respond correctly more than half of the time: when the
50. Educators without a school law class scored higher than those with a course in only
one instance, displaying the Ten Commandments in the classroom. See supra notes 32-34 and
accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Appendix, Table I, (C), (E), (G).
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. Id. at 495.
54. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971) (method
of remedy); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Milliken ! (metro-
politan desegregation plan overruled); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Milliken III (remedial reading programs and teacher training programs permissible
educational remedies).
55. Responses to this question clearly illustrate educators' confusion concerning the appro-
priateness of metropolitan desegregation plans. Thirty-five percent replied that such plans were
favored over in-city desegregation plans, forty-two percent replied no, and twenty-four percent
did not know.
56. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). It should be noted that the Milliken I Court left the possibility of
an interdistrict remedy open where "the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school
districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district or where district lines have been
deliberately drawn on the basis of race." Id. at 55. See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
433 U.S. 406 (1977) (system-wide impact may require system-wide remedy).
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educators were administrators, or when they had taken a school law class."
In determining whether a deliberate attempt at school segregation exists
on the part of the state, courts not only look to the assignment of students
to schools, but also consider factors such as the racial mix of teachers, the
quality of the facilities, and extracurricular activities. 8 The majority of
educators knew that the non-racial assignment of faculty was an important
factor considered in most school desegregation plans.19
Educators exhibited less confusion on other questions concerning deseg-
regation. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,611 the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare is empowered to withhold federal funds from school
districts that continue to practice discrimination. Seventy percent of the
educators surveyed recognized that such control of federal money was a
source of federal authority in desegregation plans.6 '
More than half of the educators knew that there are limitations on parents'
right to send their children to the public school of their choice. 62 In Green
v. County School Board, 6  the Supreme Court struck down a desegregation
plan that allowed pupils to choose their own public school. School admin-
istrators scored above other educators on this issue and on the related issue
of exempting ethnic groups from desegregation. 64 A school law class had
little effect on responses to the ethnic group exemption issue, exhibiting a
one percent difference, but increased educator awareness on the freedom of
choice issue by eleven percent.6 5
Educators' responses on the desegregation issues varied greatly, from forty-
two percent correct on the question of metropolitan desegregation to seventy-
57. Fifty percent of the administrators replied correctly, compared with forty-one percent
of the teachers. Educators who had taken a school law class showed the greatest difference,
with fifty-one percent responding correctly compared with only thirty-four percent of those
without a class.
58. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 18-19. See also supra note
54 and accompanying text.
59. See Appendix, Table I, (L). Sixty-two percent of the total sample responded correctly.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 200(c) & (d) (1970). See also Note, The Courts, HEW and Southern School
Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321 (1976).
61. Administrators (eighty-eight percent) and those with masters degrees (eighty-seven per-
cent) had the largest number of correct responses. Teachers with only five or less years of
experience scored the lowest at sixty-eight percent. See Appendix, Table I, (I).
62. Sixty-nine percent of the educators noted that parents did not have the right to send
their children to the public school of their choice. Administrators scored a high of seventy-
eight percent. See Appendix, Table I, (K).
63. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The Court reasoned that the fourteenth amendment requires
compulsory desegregation in education, and that the freedom-of-choice system was operating
against desegregation in that community.
64. Administrators scored seventy-eight percent correct on the issue of freedom of school
choice, and eighty-one percent on exempting ethnic groups from desegregation. See Tasky v.
Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (Hispanic students in ethnically separate schools),
remanded on other grounds, aff'd in part, 572 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1978).
65. See Appendix, Table I, (J)-(K).
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five percent correct on the question of exempting ethnic groups from deseg-
regation.6 Administrators exhibited the greatest understanding of the deseg-
regation issue, achieving the highest score on three of the five questions
asked. 67 On this part of the survey, school law classes had an obvious effect
on educators' knowledge, with those taking a class achieving a higher score
on each question.
68
B. Illinois School Code and Common Law
In Category II, the respondents proved uninformed about the Illinois
School Code and tort law. This section of the survey contained twenty-five
questions about Illinois statutory and common law. The scope of the ques-
tions was comprehensive and dealt with areas including student rights, 6
transportation of students, 0 teachers' procedural rights,7' and teacher liability
for negligence. 72
1. Student Rights
When asked questions about regulations that apply to students, such as
truancy, suspension, and expulsion, educators scored above seventy-five
percent only once." When asked whether or nota student was truant if he
had been absent five of thirty consecutive days, fifty-two percent of the
educators incorrectly responded yes.7' A school law class did not improve
the responses, although years of experience did." Correct responses con-
cerning suspension and expulsion were higher. Most educators recognized
that a suspension in Illinois may not exceed ten days.76 Surprisingly, admin-
66. See Appendix, Table 1, (I)-(M).
67. See Appendix, Table I, (I)-(K).
68. See Appendix, Table I, (I)-(M).
69. See Appendix, Table II, (A)-(F). See also infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
70. See Appendix, Table II, (G)-(H). See also infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
71. See Appendix, Table II, (l)-(O). See also infra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
72. See Appendix, Table II, (P)-(Y). See also infra notes 114-139 and accompanying text.
73. See Appendix, Table Ii, (A)-(D). Seventy-six percent answered correctly concerning the
maximum length of a student's suspension.
74. Illinois law defines a "truant" as "a child subject to compulsory school attendance and
who is absent without valid cause from such attendance for a school day or portion thereof."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 26-2(a) (1985). A "chronic or habitual truant" is one who is "subject
to compulsory school attendance and who is absent without valid cause from such attendance
for 10 out of 40 consecutive school days." Id.
75. Thirty-three percent of the educators without a school law class responded correctly,
compared with thirty-two percent of those with a class. The scores of teachers with eleven or
more years of experience were seven percent higher than those with only five or less years
experience. See Appendix, Table II, (A).
76. IL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.6(b) (1985). It should be noted that a suspension
resulting from gross disobedience or misconduct on a school bus may exceed ten days for safety
reasons.
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istrators were only marginally more aware than teachers of the time limit
placed on suspensions. 77 A school law class made a substantial difference in
educator responses, marking a fourteen percent increase in correct answers.7 1
A school law class strongly influenced the outcome of the survey on
questions concerning student expulsion. Twenty-two percent more of the
school law educators knew that an expulsion lasted from eleven days to the
end of the year. 9 Twenty-four percent more school law class educators were
aware that a hearing officer may hear the facts of a student expulsion case
and then pass the evidence on to the board of education."" This factor was
more determinative in eliciting correct responses than level of education,
experience or classification."
Likewise, a school law class was once again the most significant factor in
obtaining correct answers concerning student activities within the schools.
Sixty-six percent of all educators knew that fraternities, sororities, or secret
societies are prohibited in public schools. 2 Amongst those with a school law
class this number increased to seventy-four percent, fourteen percent higher
than those without a course."3
Illinois schools allow a moment of silence at the beginning of each day.
4
A similar Alabama statute, mandating a period of silence, was upheld in
Wallace v. Jaffree. -1 It is interesting to note that those with the least
experience as educators had the highest number of correct responses when
questioned about the permissibility of the moment of silence. 6 Once again
a school law class improved the number of correct responses. 7
77. Seventy-eight percent of the administrators knew of the limitation, compared to seventy-
five percent of the teachers. See Appendix, Table II, (B).
78. Id.
79. See Appendix, Table II, (C).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.6(a) (1985). See also Appendix, Table II, (D).
81. See Appendix, Table 11, (D).
82. See Appendix, Table ii, (E). Under Illinois law a student may be suspended or expelled
who "is a member of or joins or promises to join, or who becomes pledged to become a
member of, or who solicits any other person to join or be pledged to become a member of
any public school fraternity, sorority or secret society." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 31-3 (1985).
See also Sutton v. Board of Educ. of the City of Springfield, 306 111. 507, 138 N.E. 131 (1923)
(secret societies forbidden in public schools). It should be noted, however, that universities are
excluded from this prohibition by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 31-5 (1985).
83. See Appendix, Table II, (E). Years of experience also was a significant factor, since the
educators with the most experience scored sixteen percent higher than those with the least.
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 771.1 (1985). The statute makes it clear that the period of
silence may not be used as a religious activity, but rather as "an opportunity for silent reflection
on the anticipated activities of the day." Id.
85. 459 U.S. 1314 (1985). The Alabama statute consisted of three provisions: I) a mandatory
period of silence; 2) a mandatory period of silence for prayer or meditation; and 3) teacher-
led voluntary prayer. The latter two provisions were struck down on the ground that they
furthered a religious purpose.
86. See Appendix, Table II, (F).
87. Sixty-eight percent of the educators with a school law class responded correctly, com-
[Vol. 35:259
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On the whole, the survey sample exhibited a lack of knowledge about
regulations that are applicable to students. This was particularly true for
regulations dealing with time limitations."' In all but one category," a school
law course increased the number of correct responses.
2. Transportation of Students
The survey contained two questions dealing with the provision of free
transportation to students. Initially, educators were asked whether school
districts are required to provide free transportation for students living more
than one and one-half miles from school." Seventy percent correctly re-
sponded that such transportation is required.9 Those with a school law class
were more aware of this requirement than educators without a class. 92 Non-
public school students are covered by a similar statutory provision that
provides for transportation to school. 93 There is no statutory provision,
however, providing transportation for non-school activities for private school
students. 94 Sixty-two percent of all teachers and administrators responded
that public schools were not permitted to provide such transportation.95 A
school law class was the only determinative factor, resulting in a marked
increase in the number of correct responses. 96
3. Teachers' Procedural Rights
It would seem likely that job security would be uppermost in teachers'
minds, but the responses demonstrated that such was not the case. Many
teachers and administrators were unaware of their procedural rights during
their probationary period and when faced with dismissal. Additionally, many
educators did not understand their rights and obligations in relation to union
activities.
pared to fifty-two percent of those without a class. Administrators also scored higher than
teachers, sixty-eight percent compared with fifty-seven percent. Those with masters degrees,
however, scored six percent lower than those with bachelors degrees.
88. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 75.
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-3 (1985). Such transportation need not be provided when
adequate public transportation is available.
91. See Appendix, Table 11, (G).
92. Id. Seventy-eight percent of the educators with a school law class responded correctly
compared with only sixty-three percent of those with no law class. Experience had little effect
on the outcome, but administrators did score seven percent higher than teachers.
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-4 (1985).
94. Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-3.4 (1985) (public school transportation for recreational,
cultural, educational and public service programs); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-3.2 (1985)
(transportation to and from private school activities).
95. See Appendix, Table Ii, (H).
96. Id. Seventy-three percent of the educators with a school law class answered correctly
compared to only fifty percent without a class.
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Under Illinois law a school board is required to give sixty days notice
before the end of the school term to dismiss a first-year probationary
teacher. 7 The statute does not require that a reason for such dismissal be
stated. Administrators were most cognizant of this rule, with a seventy-five
percent rate of correct answers.98 A school law class increased this number
by fourteen percent, as did attaining a masters degree, which showed an
increase of twelve percent." School boards are also empowered to extend a
second-year teacher's probationary period for an additional year, but must
state the reasons for the extension and indicate corrective actions that should
be taken. "'" The majority of educators knew of this possible extension.""
By statute in Illinois, a teacher may be dismissed for "incompetency,
cruelty, negligence, immorality or other sufficient cause."" 2 A hearing officer
makes the final decision for teacher termination."" A significant majority
of educators, fifty-four percent, did not know this fact." The lack of
awareness applied to teachers (fifty-four percent), administrators (fifty-six
percent), those with a school law course (fifty-two percent), and the most
experienced educators (sixty-one percent)., 5
A state school board or superintendent for public education may set the
standards for teaching departmentalized subjects. "1 The only limitation on
the board's action is that it may not act arbitrarily.' 7 Seventy-one percent
of the total sample realized that a school board did have the authority to
raise academic qualifications in departmentalized subjects. ' "
Educators exhibited little more cognizance of regulations governing union
matters. The agency shop provision of the Illinois School Code permits the
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-11 (1985).
98. See Appendix, Table I!, (I).
99. Id.
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-11 (1985).
101. See Appendix, Table II, (J). Educational level and experience had negligible effects on
the survey outcome. Teachers scored marginally higher than administrators, seventy-seven
percent compared to seventy-three percent. A school law class produced only an eight percent
higher response than no class.
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4 (1985). Ninety-two percent of all educators surveyed
were cognizant of the grounds for teacher dismissal.- See Appendix, Table Ii, (K).
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1985):
The hearing officer shall with reasonable dispatch make a decision as to whether
or not the teacher shall be dismissed and shall give a copy of the decision to both
the teacher and the school board. The decision of the hearing officer is final unless
reviewed as provided in Section 24-16 of this act.
104. See Appendix, Table I1, (L).
105. Id.
106. Lenard v. Board of Educ. of Fairfield Dist. No. 112, 57 III. App. 3d 853, 373 N.E.2d
477, 15 Ill. Dec. 131 (5th Dist. 1978), aff'd, 74 111. 2d 260, 384 N.E.2d 1321, 24 II1. Dec. 163
(1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 2-3.25, 18-8 (1985).
107. Id. Administrators scored the highest at eighty-eight percent, followed by those with a
school law course at eighty-one percent.
108. See Appendix, Table II, (M).
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school board to include a provision in the contract requiring employees
covered by the agreement who are not members of the representative orga-
nization to pay their proportionate share of the cost of the collective bar-
gaining process and contract administration."' 9 Only a small majority of
administrators (fifty-three percent) were aware of the agency shop provision,
as were only fifty-six percent and forty-one percent of those with and without
a school law course, respectively.'10
Strikes by public employees in Illinois have not been permitted in the
past."' Legislation passed in 1984 now permits educational employees to
engage in strikes under certain conditions." 2 Only forty percent of the
respondents knew about the new bill, while five percent responded that they
did not know." 3
4. Teacher Liability for Negligence
In most instances, the duty of care required to avoid tort liability is that
which a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would exercise for the safety
of others in the same circumstances." 4 In Illinois, however, the teacher is
placed in the same position as a parent and is immune from suits that allege
mere negligence." 5 Rather, plaintiffs bringing tort actions against educators
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.40(a) (1985). See also Hudson v. Chicago Teacher's
Union, Local No. 1, 573 F. Supp. 1505 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (fair share fee requirements not violative
of equal protection clause), rev'd on other grounds, 743 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1984).
110. See Appendix, Table II, (N).
Ill. Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Il1. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (organized teacher
strikes thwarted "a thorough and efficient system of free schools").
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 1713 (1985). Educational employees can strike only under
the following conditions:
(a) they are represented by an exclusive bargaining representative;
(b) mediation has been used without success;
(c) at least 5 days have elapsed after a notice of intent to strike has been given by
the exclusive bargaining representative to the educational employer, the regional
superintendent and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board;
(d) the collective bargaining agreement between the educational employer and
educational employees, if any, has expired; and
(e) the employer and the exclusive bargaining representative have not mutually
submitted the unresolved issues to arbitration.
113. See Appendix, Table It, (0). Degree, experience, having a school law class (thirty-three
percent) and being an admininstrator (thirty percent) made little difference in terms of correct
responses.
114. See, e.g., Hardware State Bank v. Cotner, 55 Ill. 2d 240, 302 N.E.2d 257 (1973); Ortiz
v. Warren Chevrolet, Inc., 24 Il. App. 3d 199, 321 N.E.2d 77 (5th Dist. 1974); Fugate v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 12 Ill. App. 3d 656, 299 N.E.2d 108 (Ist Dist. 1973).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84(a) (1985). See also Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd.
of Educ., 63 II. 2d 165. 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976) (teachers stand in loco parentis to students in
activities connected with school activities). See generally, Gardner, Changing Patterns in Illinois'
School Tort Immunity, 55 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 605 (1979); Siegel, School Tort Immunity;
Recent Trends, 71 ILL. B.J. 240 (1982); Kerwin, Tort Liability for Schools Under the Illinois
Tort Immunity Act, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 441 (1976).
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must show that the teacher's actions constituted wilful and wanton miscon-
duct.'1 6 The majority of the respondents were unaware of this requirement.
In response to the question on the liability of teachers for ordinary negligence,
only thirty-one percent of the total sample responded correctly." 7
Educators fared no better on questions that applied the immunity doctrine
to particular case situations. Educational employees have in loco parentis
status only in matters relating to discipline or supervision of school activi-
ties."" Under this doctrine, if a child is sent out of the classroom as
punishment, and is injured outside of the room, the teacher is ordinarily
not liable.'' 9 In all groups except administrators (seventy-eight percent),
correct responses equaled or exceeded eighty percent.'20 If a child were injured
while running an errand for the teacher, most educators recognized that
liability would exist if no disciplinary or school activity was involved.' 2' The
sample group was also questioned about the liability of a child who inflicts
an injury. 22 In Illinois, a child under the age of seven is not legally capable
of negligent action.' 23 Only sixty-three percent of the sample knew this fact.' 24
A school law course improved responses to a high of seventy-six percent.' 5
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-24, 34-84(a) (1985). See Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 63 Ill. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976). Cf. Nielsen v. Community Unit School Dist. No.
3, 90 Ill. App. 3d 243, 412 N.E.2d 1177, 45 Ill. Dec. 595 (4th Dist. 1980).
117. See Appendix, Table II, (Q). A masters degree (thirty-three percent), having had a law
course (forty-six percent), or being an administrator (thirty percent) appeared to have only
minimal influence on the sample's response. However, it should be noted that the majority of
educators, particularly administrators (eighty-five percent), did understand that the doctrine of
in loco parentis gave them a position similar to that of parents to the students in the school.
See Appendix, Table 11, (P).
118. Montague v. School Bd. of Thornton Fractional Township North High School Dist.
215, 57 Ill. App. 3d 828,' 373 N.E.2d 719, 15 Ill. Dec. 373 (1st Dist. 1978) (pupil injured while
attempting to vault horse during gym class); Mancha v. Field Museum of Natural History, 5
Ill. App. 3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (Ist Dist. 1972) (teacher not liable for injury to assaulted
student while on school-related museum visit). Cf. Lynch v. Board of Educ. of Collinsville
Community Unit School Dist. No. 10, 82 Ill. 2d 415, 412 N.E.2d 447, 45 Ill. Dec. 96 (1979)
(liability for unauthorized football game, held after school hours on school property, using
school equipment and volunteer teachers).
119. Id.
120. See Appendix, Table II, (V).
121. See Appendix, Table II, (T). Seventy-nine percent of the total responses were correct.
A school law class raised slightly the number of correct answers from seventy-six percent to
eighty-three percent. Surprisingly, those with the least experience scored highest, ninety-four
percent.
122. See Appendix, Table 11, (U).
123. Carroll v. McGrath, 25 Ill. App. 3d 436, 323 N.E.2d 513 (Ist Dist. 1974) (five-year-old
legally incapable of negligent action); Wegler v. Luebke, 87 Ill. App. 2d 82, 231 N.E.2d 109
(2d Dist. 1967) (minors between ages of seven and fourteen held to standard of care of
reasonable person of same age, intelligence, capacity and experience in same or similar situation).
124. See Appendix, Table I1, (U).
125. Id.
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Although teachers have immunity from liability in matters of discipline,
this immunity is not absolute. In People v. Ball, 126 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that when teachers administer corporal punishment, they are
subject to the same standard of reasonableness that applies to parents in
disciplining children. Educators were uncertain when asked if they had
unqualified immunity when administering corporal punishment.' 2 Adminis-
trators fared the best at seventy-five percent. 28 A school law course raised
scores by seventeen percent. 29 The majority of educators did know, however,
that they were not absolutely immune from defamation suits by students.'30
Surprisingly, an overwhelming majority of educators were cognizant of the
fact that they should not administer medication or first aid to students. 3'
The Illinois courts have held that when medical treatment is undertaken by
a school or its agent, public policy considerations dictate a duty of competent
performance, holding school districts and teachers to an ordinary standard
of care. 132
The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act '3 provides that "[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting
from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is liable." Such
immunity may be waived when the entity has liability insurance. 34 When
asked whether a school board would pay for financial losses resulting from
an educator's conduct, fifty-one percent of the educators correctly responded
no.'35 The largest difference in responses across all categories was seventeen
percent. '36
Does a student have the right to reach a predetermined level of achievement
in return for state-mandated school attendance? In educational malpractice
cases, ' the courts have reasoned that to hold a school district liable for a
126. 58 Ill. 2d 36, 317 N.E.2d 54 (1974) (sixth-grade student struck with wooden paddle).
127. Of the total sample only sixty-two percent responded correctly. See Appendix, Table
11, (W).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Eighty percent of the sample responded correctly.
131. See Appendix, Table II, (S). Ninety-three percent of the sample answered correctly.
Once again, the least experienced had the highest score (ninety-seven percent).
132. O'Brien v. Township High School Dist. 214, 73 II1. App. 3d 618, 392 N.E.2d 615, 29
III. Dec. 918, aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 83 Ill. 2d 462, 415 N.E.2d 1015,
47 III. Dec. 702 (1979).
133. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-109 (1985).
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-103(b) (1985). See also Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist.,
51 111. 2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972); Beckus v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 78 I1. App. 3d 558,
397 N.E.2d 175, 33 Ill. Dec. 842 (1st Dist. 1979).
135. See Appendix, Table II, (R).
136. Id.
137. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr.
854 (5th Dist. 1976). See also Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440,
391 N.E.2d 352, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (1979) (no liability for educational malpractice); Elson, A
Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching,
73 Nw. U.L. REV. 641 (1978) (advocating a cause of action for educational malpractice).
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student's failure to learn exposes all educational agencies to countless "real
or imagined" tort claims by disaffected students and parents.'38 Only thirty-
nine percent of the respondents answered correctly. 39 Those who had had a
school law class did much better than those without: fifty-six percent and
twenty-four percent respectively.14' This was one instance when teachers had
a higher percentage of correct responses (forty percent) than administrators
(thirty-eight percent). 141
Educators' responses to questions about teacher liability exhibited confu-
sion on their part. Administrators, however, had the highest scores on four
of the questions, each dealing with the application of the immunity doctrine
to particular situations. 42 A school law course improved responses on all
but one question. 43
C. Student and Parent Rights
1. Student Free Speech Rights
Educators were asked twenty-seven questions dealing with student and
parental rights and school policies. Students' rights to freedom of expression
arise in a number of contexts: school newspapers, personal appearance,
demonstrations and academic freedom in curriculum. The sample was sur-
prisingly uncertain on a number of crucial topics.
Control over school newspapers and the students' right to freedom of
speech in them is one of the more highly litigated areas in school law. In
most jurisdictions, student newspapers are viewed as "independent student
publications."'" Attempts by school authorities to impose restraints on
content are seen as governmental censorship. Unless specific areas have
previously been banned for publication, school authorities usually may not
138. The court noted conflicting theories of how children should be taught and the numerous
factors influencing literacy, and concluded that there were "no readily accessible standards of
care, or cause, or injury." Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d
at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
139. See Appendix, Table II, (Y).
140. Id. Those with a bachelors degree scored better than those with a masters, forty-one
percent and thirty-six percent respectively, and those with the least experience scored better
than those with greater experience-forty-two percent, thirty-seven percent, and thirty-nine
percent, respectively.
141. Id.
142. See Appendix, Table 11, (V)-(Y).
143. See Appendix, Table 11, (V).
144. See Quaterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456
(4th Cir. 1973); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
826 (1970). See also Letwin, Administrative Censorship of the Independent Student Press-
Demise of the Double Standard? 28 S.C.L. REv. 565 (1977) (merging of standards for inde-
pendent adult newspapers and school papers); Note, Administrative Regulation of the High
School Press, 83 MicH. L. REV. 625 (1984).
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censor publication of a student newspaper.' 5 One potentially litigious area
includes prior censorship.'" When asked whether school officials could
require prior approval of a student newspaper before publication, sixty-six
percent of the total sample incorrectly replied yes."47 Additionally, educators
were asked if administrators could regulate the time, location and method
of student distribution of newspapers. Eighty-six percent of those surveyed
answered correctly, yes.1' 8 Administrators and educators with only five or
less years of experience scored the highest, eighty-eight percent and ninety
percent respectively. 1
49
A significant majority of the sample across all categories did not under-
stand the legal meaning of obscenity as applied to student publications.
Obscenity receives less constitutional protection for both adults and stu-
dents.' ° The Supreme Court ruled that vulgarity-"four letter slang words"
for sexual intercourse, dirty cartoons, or offensive language-is not obscene.
145. Id. A publication may be stopped if it poses a substantial danger to the educational
process. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971). School officials may
also limit distribution of material they deem libelous. Shanely v. Northeast Indep. School Dist.,
462 F.2d 960, 971 (5th Cir. 1972); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir.
1972). See also Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). Although not a
school case, Connick will have an impact on the freedom of speech of public employees. In
Connick, an assistant district attorney was terminated for distributing an office questionnaire
dealing with the plaintiff's transfer, office politics and political patronage. The Supreme Court
held that the theme of the questionnaire was a personal grievance and was not entitled to first
amendment protection. According to the Court, the questions posed by the district attorney
did not fall under the rubric of matters of public concern. In Day v. South Park Indep. School
Dist., 768 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1985), a teacher was fired because she followed the grievance
procedure established by the school district. Day found no remedy in the federal courts, which
held that her grievance was not violative of the first amendment because it was a purely private
matter and not of public concern.
146. One court has observed:
As an exercise of freedom of the press, student literature enjoys constitutional
protection regardless of its sponsorship, authorship, or place of publication. School
authorities may reasonably control the time, place, and manner of literature distri-
bution of noncensorial purpose, but they may not use such regulations as a guide
to suppress or censor the content of student writings.
Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as moot, 420
U.S. 128 (1975). See also Gambina v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (C.A. Va.
1977) (school board cannot ban publication of portions of school papers it deems objectionable);
Nicholson v. Board of Educ., Torrance Unified School Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (C.A. Cal. 1982)
(high school principal could review small number of sensitive articles for accuracy rather than
censorship).
147. See Appendix, Table Il1, (A). Level of education, experience, school law class, and
classification had little effect on the answers.
148. See Appendix, Table Ill, (B). A school law class had no effect on survey responses;
both categories scored eighty percent.
149. Id.
150. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (adults); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1969) (students).
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Vulgarity is not erotic, nor does it appeal to prurient or morbid interests.-5
In Ginsberg v. New York,"' the Court ruled obscenity in the schools is
defined by whether the adult community as a whole finds the material
patently offensive for distribution to minors. As with adult material, student
publications typically have not been held legally obscene, even when they
contain references to sexual intercourse or use four-letter words.' 53 Educators
across the board had no understanding of the meaning of obscenity. Fifty-
eight percent of the sample incorrectly responded that a student publication
was obscene if it contained "vulgar or dirty language." 5 , A school law class
had little effect on the number of correct responses.' From these results,
educators obviously need greater information on students' rights to freedom
of expression through school papers.
One particularly cloudy area of the law concerns the constitutionality of
school regulation of student hair and dress style. Although the circuits have
split on this issue, 56 the Seventh Circuit has held such regulation unconsti-
tutional.' Educators generally exhibited a keen awareness of the Seventh
Circuit's position. All surveyed categories responded correctly, by a large
margin, that the courts look upon differences in dress and grooming as
matters of personal freedom.'
The right of students to demonstrate on campus is closely related to the
issue of students' personal appearance. The Supreme Court upheld the right
of students to peacefully demonstrate on campus in Tinker v. Des Moines
151. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973).
152. 390 U.S. 629 (1969). "[Sltudent publications distributed in schools may be obscene
where they would not ordinarily be in public distribution to adults." Id. at 639.
153. Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 1973); Scoville v.
Board of Educ. of Joliet Township, 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1973). School officials may forbid
the distribution of obscene or pornographic materials. See Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ.,
440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
154. See Appendix, Table III, (C). None of the groups of educators in this survey scored
above thirty percent correct.
155. Id. Those with a school law class scored twenty-nine percent correct; those without,
twenty percent.
156. The First, Second, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits held hair and dress codes
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (Ist Cir. 1970); Massie v.
Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have upheld such regulations. See, e.g.,
Zeller v. Donegal School Dist., 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975); Karn v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609
(5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444
(6th Cir. 1981); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 979 (1971); Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974).
157. Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
901 (1974).
158. See Appendix, Table III, (D). Educators with a school law class scored eighty-nine
percent, those without a class, eighty-three percent. Administrators scored the highest at ninety-
three percent.
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Independent Community School District. 5 9 The Court held that students
were permitted to wear black armbands in school to protest the Vietnam
War. Student demonstrations could not be prohibited when school authorities
could not reasonably foresee "substantial disruption," or "material inter-
ference" with school activities.160 A small majority of educators recognized
that students have a right to demonstrate.' 6' Administrators scored surpris-
ingly low on this question, with only fifty percent correct. A school law
class had no effect on the outcome. 62
Finally, in the area of first amendment protections, students retain some
interest in academic freedom. 63 The major area of conflict concerning
academic freedom centers on the choice of, or removal of, books as textbooks
or as part of a school library. The courts have rarely interfered with local
school board decisions on courses and curriculum. 161 School boards, however,
may not be guided in such choices by the desire to impose religious or
scientific orthodoxy, or to exclude a particular type of idea. 16 Responses to
this question reflect a wide range of confusion. Fifty-three percent of all
educators answered that students did not have a right to determine curricula
and courses; thirty-five percent believed students had such a right; and eleven
percent did not know. 66
2. Students' Due Process Rights
Students also possess due process rights relative to searches of their person
and property, and disciplinary procedures. Educators were somewhat better
informed about these rights. On the issue of the sufficiency of evidence
necessary to justify search and seizure, the majority of Illinois educators
wrongly believed that both "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause"
159. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
160. Id. at 509. For further discussion of the substantial disruption standard, see Barker v.
Hardway, 394 U.S. 905 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring); Tate v. Board of Educ. of Jonesboro,
453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972).
161. See Appendix, Table 111, (E). Sixty-four percent answered correctly.
162. Id. Level of experience and education also had little effect on the results.
163. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (student
brought action against school board challenging removal of books from certain courses and
school library); Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979) (exclusion of texts from
curriculum); Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (text selection
motivated by racial discrimination).
School boards should establish procedural guidelines for book selection and removal. Board
of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., No. 18 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (removal
of books from library).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1306.
166. See Appendix, Table I11, (F). Confusion was particularly apparent among teachers,
whose responses were forty percent yes, forty-eight percent no, and twelve percent did not
know, and teachers with five or less years of experience, who responded twenty-one percent
yes, forty-two percent no, and thirty-two percent did not know.
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are needed for school officials to search student lockers and desks. 67 One
court has held that students do not have an expectation of privacy in their
lockers or desks, and that because of the authority and responsibility of
school officials, a warrant is not required to conduct such searches. 68 Fifty
percent of administrators were unsure. 69 Although in loco parentis authority
makes school officials "the parents" of all children in the school, school
searches cannot be upheld on this basis.7 0 School officials, however, do not
need a warrant for student searches as do police officials. 17' Educators are
held to the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, as
is required of police officials. There are two requirements for a search by
school authorities: 1) the search must be conducted within the scope of the
educational function of the school, and 2) the search must be reasonable
under the particular facts of the case. 72 Body and strip searches require far
more precise suspicions, based on stronger evidence of guilt, serious danger,
or evidence of criminal acts.7
On the related issue of whether police authorities need a search warrant
when school administrators call in the police to make the search or for
assistance, the sample was equally uninformed. 74 Illinois courts have distin-
guished between education-related searches by school authorities, with or
without the collaboration of police authorities, and searches resulting from
pre-planned determination by administrators to aid police officers. In Picha
v. Wieglos,'"1 it was ruled that police who are normally in quest of illegal
contraband that can be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution cannot
dwell "under the banner of loco parentis." Less than one-half (forty-six
percent) of the sample understood the role of police in school-related
searches. 176
As the survey reflects, educators were also uncertain about issues involving
the punishment of students. One such issue involves the reduction of student
167. See Appendix, Table Ill, (J). Fifty-seven percent of the sample believed school officials
need reasonable suspicion to search school lockers. A school law class did not correct this
misapprehension.
168. People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); People
v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969) (no expectation of privacy
in school locker).
169. Id.
170. Tanter v. Taybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1749 (1985).
171. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 464 U.S. 991 (1985).
172. Id. at 998.
173. See Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, 431 F.2d 91
(7th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 101 U.S. 3015 (1981); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y.
1977).
174. See Appendix, Table Ill, (L).
175. 410 F. Supp. (N.D. III. 1976). See also State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975) (police
need probable cause), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
176. See Appendix, Table Ill, (K), (L). Only fifty percent of administrators, forty-five percent
of teachers and fifty-six percent of those with a school law course responded correctly.
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grades for unexcused absences. Although the issue has not been conclusively
settled by the courts, educators should be cognizant that a school policy or
decision must be reasonable and protect the property interests of the students.
In Hamer v. Board of Education, Township High School District #133,'1 a
student challenged the right of the administration to reduce grades as a
punishment for unauthorized absence from class. The court held that the
student was entitled to a hearing and procedural remedies before such a
serious sanction could be applied.17 Only fifty-six percent of the total sample
responded correctly. 7 9
In regard to due process for in-school suspension of students, the majority
(sixty-five percent), across all categories, incorrectly thought the same level
of due process was owed students for in-school suspension or detention as
for out-of-school suspension.8 0 The courts have considered brief in-school
sanctions too insubstantial to require prepunishment hearings.
3. Access to Student Records
The Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 8' known as the
Buckley amendment, was passed by Congress in 1974 as a result of dissat-
isfaction with school officials' attempts to ameliorate abuses associated with
student record-keeping practices.' 2 The Act gives students over eighteen and
parents a right of access to school records. 83 Under the Act, parents must
be informed of their right to review and inspect their children's school
records. 84 Further, parents may challenge inaccurate or misleading data in
educational records through specified procedures.8 5 The vast majority of the
survey sample evidenced familiarity with these sections of the Buckley
177. 66 Ill. App. 3d 7, 383 N.E.2d 231, 22 Il. Dec. 755 (2d Dist. 1978).
178. 66 III. App. 3d at 9, 383 N.E.2d at 233, 22 Il1. Dec. at 757. The court further stated
that teachers should make grade determinations on the basis of class performance. But see
Knight v. Board of Educ. of Tri-Point Community Unit School Dist., 38 Il1. App. 3d 603, 348
N.E.2d 299 (4th Dist. 1976) (grade reduction for truancy valid).
179. See Appendix, Table Ill, (M). Only fifty-three percent of administrators, forty-nine
percent of teachers, and fifty-seven percent of those who had a school law course, as opposed
to forty-four percent with no law course, answered correctly.
180. See Appendix, Table III, (N).
181. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232(g)-1232(i) (1976).
182. See, e.g., Note, The Buckley Amendment: Opening School Files for Student and Parental
Review, 24 CATH. U.L. RaV. 588 (1975) (discussion of the Act).
183. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(l)(A) (1976). See also Illinois School Student Records Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 50-1 to 50-10 (1985).
184. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(d) (1976). See also IL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 50-5, 50-6 (1985).
185. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2) (1976). The school must hold a hearing when the accuracy of
a student record is challenged. There must be an opportunity to correct the record, and parents
must be afforded an opportunity to insert a written explanation of the record. See also ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 50-7 (1985).
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Amendment. 6 Not surprisingly, administrators scored the highest on these
questions. "87
However, not all records pertaining to a student are accessible to parents
under FERPA. FERPA bars the viewing of letters of recommendation written
prior to January 1, 1975.188 The majority of the sample, however, were not
aware that school officials could deny parents access to such records.8 9
Further, FERPA excludes review of certain records that are not classified
as "educational records."'"9 One such exclusion is the medical or psychiatric
records of students over eighteen, or attending a post-secondary educational
institution. 9' When asked whether parents had the right to see the records
of physicians or psychologists, seventy-eight percent of the educators an-
swered yes. 192 Only a two percent difference existed between those with or
without a school law course. 93 Further, in Illinois, student records may be
destroyed, or information deleted, so long as the parent is given reasonable
notice prior to such action. 94 The majority of teachers were unaware of this
provision in the Illinois School Code.' 9
On the whole, educator response to the issue of student records was mixed.
The sample evidenced familiarity with the major provisions and purpose of
FERPA,'" but showed less awareness of exclusions under the Act. 9 7 Ad-
ministrators tended to have the highest number of correct answers on this
issue, 19 although a school law course also significantly increased correct
responses.'"
4. Students with Special Needs
Today, educators face a number of legal questions concerning access to
educational facilities and programs by different groups of children with
special needs or problems. These groups include illegal immigrant children,
186. Eighty-two percent of the sample responded that parents must be given notice of their
rights under FERPA. The number of correct responses increased to ninety-one percent on the
question of parents' rights to challenge student records. See Appendix, Table 111, (0), (P).
187. Id. Administrators scored ninety-four percent correct on both questions.
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(l)(B)(ii) (1976).
189. See Appendix, Table 111, (Q). Only those who had a school law course (fifty-two percent)
gave a majority of correct responses, while only thirty-five percent of administrators, forty-
four percent of teachers, and forty-two percent of the total sample understood this issue.
190. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(i)-(iv) (1976).
191. Id.
192. See Appendix, Table Ill, (S).
193. Seventy-seven percent with a school law class responded that parents had access to
medical and psychiatric reports, compared to seventy-nine percent without a course.
194. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 50-5 (1985).
195. See Appendix, Table Ill, (T).
196. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
198. See Appendix, Table I11, (0), (Q).
199. Sixty-four percent of all responses were incorrect. See Appendix, Table Ill, (T).
[Vol. 35:259
SCHOOL LA W
pregnant or married students, and handicapped students. The survey admin-
istered questions dealing with each of these categories of students.
The right to an education is not a fundamental right under the Consti-
tution." On this basis the Supreme Court upheld a state statute permitting
a school district to deny a free education to a child who was not living with
his parents and was present in the school district only for the purpose of
attending school there.2"' However, in Plyler v. Doe,202 the Court invalidated
a state statute that denied a public education to the children of resident
illegal aliens. The court employed an equal protection analysis and concluded
that the state failed to prove a substantial state interest in excluding illegal
aliens from public education. 203 A majority of educators, fifty-two percent,
correctly responded that illegal immigrant children could not be prohibited
from attending public schools. 2° Administrators had the highest percentage
of correct responses. 20 5 A school law course improved responses by eight
percent .206
Until the early 1970's, many school districts routinely excluded pregnant
students from regular classes. 20 7 A number of lower courts, however, over-
turned these policies. 2°0 Educators noted that school districts could provide
alternative separate schools or courses for pregnant students.20 Likewise, the
200. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33-34 (1973) (upheld statute
permitting funding of public schools through property taxes, even though result could be lower
educational opportunities in less wealthy areas).
201. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983). The child, Roberto Morales, was a U.S.
citizen living with his sister in Texas for the purpose of attending school there. His parents
were Mexican citizens residing in Mexico. Morales' sister was not his guardian. Under Texas
law, a tuition-free education was denied to a minor who was not living with a parent or
guardian.
202. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
203. The Court stated that the law in question:
imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives.
By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within
the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that
they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.
457 U.S. at 223.
204. See Appendix, Table 111, (U).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See generally, Knowles, High School, Marriage and the Fourteenth Amendment, I 1 J.
FAM. L. 711, 732 (1972); Comment, Marriage, Pregnancy and the Right to Go to School, 50
*TEx. L. REV. 1196 (1972).
208. See, e.g., Shull v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D.
Miss. 1976) (exclusion based solely on pregnancy denies equal protection); Ordway v. Hargraves,
323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971) (importance of education as personal right as well as
discriminatory impact of exclusion).
209. See Appendix, Table Ill, (Y). Sixty-eight percent of all educators responded correctly,
but administrators scored highest with seventy-five percent. See also Stine & Kelley, Evaluation
of a School for Young Mothers, 46 PEDIATRICS 581 (197) (special education programs).
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courts have held that school districts cannot exclude married students from
regular schools or extracurricular activities.2 0 The majority of educators
correctly responded to questions concerning the rights of married and preg-
nant students to attend regular schools."'
States must assure all handicapped students the right to an appropriate
free public education.2"2 Parents are not required to pay for the cost of
educating handicapped children even if the child is placed in a private
institution or if the child's attendance is for a longer duration than the
district's normal school year. 2 3 A school law course significantly improved
educator responses on this question. 21 4
The courts generally allow school personnel wide latitude in setting re-
quirements for participation in school-related activities. Whatever the criteria
established-academic standards, skill, age, residency and training rules-
they must be applied without discrimination to non-handicapped and hand-
icapped students alike. 25s Handicapped students may be excluded for medical
reasons when there is possible danger to their health. However, they cannot
be denied the opportunity simply because of a physical impairment. Only
those respondents with a masters degree (fifty-six percent), teachers (fifty-
three percent), and those who did not have a school law course (fifty-two
percent) gave a majority of correct answers. 216
The survey sample exhibited uncertainty about issues concerning "special"
students. The most accurate answers centered on the rights of married and
pregnant students.2 7 A school law course improved the response level by
twenty percent or more in several instances. 218
210. Courts have rejected the argument that the married students needed to be excluded from
regular schools and school activities to discourage teenage marriages or encourage marital
responsibility. Such decisions were premised on denials of equal protection, or on a right of
privacy or "the fundamental right of marriage." See, e.g., Anderson v. Canyon Independent
School Dist., 412 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (exclusion from school); Moran v. School
Dist. No. 7, Yellowstone County, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972) (right to participate in
extracurricular activities); Indiana High School Athletic Assoc. v. Raike, 164 Ind. App. 169,
329 N.E.2d 66 (1975) (married students cannot be barred from interscholastic competition).
211. See Appendix, Table Ill, (X). The total correct responses were sixty-eight percent.
Administrators again scored highest at eighty-eight percent.
212. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348
F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children:
A Primer for the New Advocate, 1972 ILL. L. FORUM 1016.
213. Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169 (D.C. Del. 1980), aff'd 642 F. 2d 687 (3d Cir.
1981); Mahoney v. Administrative School Dist. No. 1, 42 Or. App. 665, 601 P.2d 826 (1979).
214. Seventy-two percent of the total sample answered correctly. Eighty-one percent of those
with a school law course responded correctly, compared with only sixty-one percent without a
course. See Appendix, Table Ill, (V).
215. Mahan v. Agee, 652 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1982). The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that
Peter Mohan was barred from participation in interscholastic sports because of his age (19
years old), not his dyslexia. Handicapped students must be given the same opportunity to meet
the same eligibility criteria as their non-handicapped peers.
216. See Appendix, Table Ill, (W).
217. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
218. See Appendix, Table III, (V), (X).
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D. Teachers' Rights
1. Teachers' Rights Against Discrimination
The survey sample administered questions on teachers' rights and school
board relations. The respondents were uncertain on a number of legal issues,
such as dress code, gender as a criterion for employment, tenure, residential
requirements, and loyalty oaths.
Educators exhibited confusion on issues dealing with discrimination in
teacher employment. The majority, sixty-one percent, of the sample, regard-
less of position, experience and school law courses, were unaware that a
teacher can be hired on the basis of gender where gender is a bona fide job
requirement. 2 9 In McClain v. Board of Education,220 the Illinois appellate
court ruled a tenured male teacher was not entitled to priority in employment
where the physical education position he sought required supervision of a
girls' locker room and shower.
The courts are divided on the issue of whether homosexual teachers may
be dismissed based on sexual preference. In Gaylord v. Tacoma School
Dist.,2 1 the Washington Supreme Court held that a practicing homosexual
could be dismissed. The California Supreme Court, however, concluded that
homosexual employees could not be dismissed because of a private life-
style. 22 When asked if someone could be dismissed for private sexual conduct
if it did not affect teaching ability, sixty percent of all educators correctly
answered no.2 3
In Illinois, teachers are required to retire at age 70.224 The survey sample
was asked if they could be forced to retire at age 65. Only fifty-seven percent
of the respondents answered correctly. '22 Years of experience and a school
law course produced the most correct answers.2 26
219. See Appendix, Table IV, (A). Those with five or less years experience scored highest at
forty-two percent correct.
220. 66 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 384 N.E.2d 540, 23 Ill. Dec. 746 (4th Dist. 1978).
221. 85 Wash. 2d 348, 535 P.2d 804 (1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977), aff'd, 88
Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977) (public knowledge of homosexuality impaired teaching
ability).
222. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
223. See Appendix, Table IV, (B). This question also considered cohabitating teachers. Again,
the courts are split on whether teachers may be dismissed for cohabitation. See, e.g., Reinhardt
v. Board of Educ. of Alton Community School Dist., 19 Il1. App. 3d 481, 311 N.E.2d 710
(5th Dist. 1974), vacated, 61 Ill. 2d 101 (dismissal not permissible); Sullivan v. Meade County
Indep. School Dist., 387 F. Supp. 1237 (D.S.D. 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 530 F.2d 799
(8th Cir. 1976) (dismissal for cohabitating with boyfriend upheld as related to proper functioning
of educational system).
224. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-84 (1985).
225. See Appendix, Table IV, (D).
226. Id.
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2. Freedom of Expression
Teachers' rights under the first amendment take many forms: freedom to
participate in curriculum choices, freedom to state opinions, and freedom
of association. On the whole, teachers had little awareness of their rights in
this area.
One issue presented to the survey involved the right of school boards to
impose regulations on teacher appearance. In East Hartford Education
Association v. Board of Education,2 27 the school board required male class-
room teachers to wear a jacket, shirt, and tie, and female teachers to wear
a dress, skirt, blouse or pantsuit, except where their duties required other
apparel, such as shop and gym teachers .2 8 The United States appellate court
upheld this regulation on the basis that the school board's interest in having
teachers comply with the dress code was greater than the teacher's alleged
freedom of expression interest.2 2 9 Only those with a school law course (fifty
percent) and five or less years of experience (sixty-five percent) were aware
that a school board could impose reasonable regulations governing the
appearance of teachers or could consider individual appearance as one of
the factors affecting suitability for a particular position.
2 30
The academic freedom guaranteed by the first amendment constitutes part
of a teacher's interest in teaching. Teacher's rights to academic freedom
entail both the decision to introduce outside materials into the curriculum
and the right to refuse to teach portions of the curriculum. Classroom
discussions are constitutionally protected speech.2 31 However, a teacher's
227. 562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
228. 562 F.2d at 839-40 n.I.
229. Id. at 857-58. The school board's interest in maintaining the teacher dress code was to
instill respect, discipline and traditional values upon the student body. This rationale also
defeated plaintiff's claim of infringement of a liberty interest. Id. at 861. See also Miller v.
School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974) (rejected teachers' constitutional challenge
to dismissal for wearing beard and sideburns). But see Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp. 477
(N.D. Ala. 1970) (rule of principal in one school prohibiting teachers from wearing mustaches
violated both due process and equal protection when there was no indication that mustaches
would disrupt education process or pose health hazards); Braxton v. Board of Public Instruction
of Duval City, 303 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (right of black teacher to wear goatee as
expression of his black heritage protected by due process and equal protection clauses).
230. See Appendix, Table IV, (F).
231. Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980). See also
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Keefe v. Geanakos,
418 F.2d 359 (Ist Dist. 1969). The right to academic freedom is strongly supported:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom . . . [T]he classroom
is peculiarly the "market place of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
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right to academic freedom is limited. Due to the deference accorded school
board decisions concerning curriculum,"' teachers may not institute changes
that constitute abandonment of the curriculum. 233 Generally, teachers are
permitted to discuss controversial topics in the classroom when the topics
are related to the assigned subject. 234 However, teachers may neither disregard
the prescribed text or syllabus, 23" nor advocate their religious or personal
beliefs in the classroom. 23 6 The right to teach controversial subjects that are
related to the course content was known only by fifty-six percent of admin-
istrators and fifty percent of those with a school law course.23 7
Additionally, teachers enjoy no constitutional protection for refusing to
follow the school curriculum, even when the refusal is based on religious
grounds. 23 Sixty-eight percent of the sample responded that teachers could
not refuse to teach the prescribed curriculum. 2 9 Surprisingly, eighty-one
percent of the sample with five or less years of experience had the right
answer.
240
In addition to the right of speech in the classroom, teachers have the right
to openly criticize their superiors on issues of public concern. 2 4' The fact
that the criticism is private does not remove it from constitutional protection.
selection.
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citing United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
232. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
233. Id. See also Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972
(1973).
234. Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980).
235. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 602 (10th Cir. 1979).
236. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1963) (struck down statute prohibiting teaching
evolutionary theory in public schools). However, school authorities may not arbitrarily censor
a teacher's speech simply because they do not agree with the political philosophy of the speech.
James v. Board of Educ. of Central Dist. No. 1, 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1042 (1972) (overturned teacher dismissal for wearing black armband to protest Vietnam
War).
Seventy-nine percent of all educators knew that they could not promote political candidates
in the classroom. Administrators scored highest in this area with eighty-eight percent correct
answers. See Appendix, Table IV, (1). Only a slight majority, fifty-one percent, knew they
could wear political buttons or armbands to class. Teachers with eleven or more years of
experience scored the highest on this question. See Appendix, Table IV, (J).
237. See Appendix, Table IV, (G). Only forty-five percent of the total sample answered
correctly.
238. Palmer v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 466 F. Supp. 600, 604 (N.D. i11. 1979)
(refusal to participate in pledge of allegiance was protected speech, but refusal to teach patriotic
songs or conduct holiday activities was not). A number of other courts have also held that
failure to teach a prescribed curriculum is not protected. See, e.g., Adams v. Campbell County
School Dist., 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1975); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Ahern v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972).
239. See Appendix, Table IV, (E).
240. Id.
241. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District,2 42 a teacher com-
plained to her principal about employment practices that she thought were
racially discriminatory. The court held that her speech was protected, but
noted that in cases of private expression, additional factors may be considered
to determine if the speech is protected. 24 3 Only fifty-six percent of the sample
knew that such speech is protected. 2" A school law class resulted in the
highest scores. 245
The first amendment also protects teachers' rights to freedom of associ-
ation. 246 The Supreme Court, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,24 7 ruled that
guilt by association is unconstitutional. States may neither compel teachers
to disclose all ties with organizations,2 s4 nor may teachers be dismissed
because of affiliations with a particular group, party, or political candidate.24 9
The sample, however, did not know whether teachers could be terminated
for belonging to communist, Nazi or revolutionary organizations. Forty-four
percent of the sample answered correctly, "no". 250 Administrators (sixty-
nine percent) had the greatest majority of correct responses, followed by
those with a law course (fifty percent).'
A teacher may not be forced to take a negative loyalty oath.2 2 However,
affirmative oaths to support the government are permissible. 253 Only those
242. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
243. When a government employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the em-
ploying agency's institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the
employee's message, but also the the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered. 439 U.S.
at 415 n.4. See also McGill V. Board of Educ. of Pekin Elementary School, 602 F.2d 774 (7th
Cir. 1979) (questionnaire circulated to teachers); Columbus Educ. Assoc. v. Columbus City
School Dist., 623 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1980) (teacher union spokesperson's statements in support
of fellow teacher's complaint protected).
244. See Appendix, Table IV, (H).
245. Id. A school law course increased correct responses by thirty-one percent.
246. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (struck down statute requiring teachers to submit
list of all organizations to which they belonged).
247. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
248. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960).
249. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (employment of public defender cannot be
conditioned on party affiliation); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (invalidated discharge of
non-civil service employees of Cook County Sheriff's Office because they were not Democrats);
Guerra v. Roma Indep. School Dist., 447 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (first amendment
rights violated by discharge in retaliation for relationship with opponents of newly elected board
members).
250. See Appendix, Table IV, (M).
251. Id.
252. Most of the negative loyalty oaths prohibited supporting the Communist party or other
subversive groups and were struck down on the basis of vagueness or overbreadth. See, e.g.,
Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. II (1966); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967).
253. Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) (upheld affirmative oath to support
Constitution); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1976) (upheld statute requiring public employee
to take oath to uphold Constitution and oppose overthrow of the government).
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groups with a school law course (fifty-eight percent) and six to ten years of
experience (fifty-six percent) knew that "negative" oaths that prohibit "sub-
versive activities" are unconstitutional. 251 Sixty-two percent of the sample
knew that affirmative oaths are constitutional.255 Although a school law
course raised correct responses by twenty-three percent, a masters degree
produced the highest number of correct responses.2 6
3. Teachers' Procedural Rights and Tenure
Educators exhibited a surprising lack of knowledge concerning the entire
tenure system: how tenure is achieved, to whom it applies, and how it is
terminated. The questions in the first part of this section related to teachers
during their probationary period. The sample was unaware that probationary
teachers could be terminated for a reason other than the deficiencies they
were initially asked to remedy.2 57 In Jackson v. Board of Education of
Chicago, 218 a teacher was notified, during her second year of probation, that
her probation would be extended for a third year. She was given a list of
particular problems to remedy. At the end of the third probation year she
was terminated for reasons different from the conditions she had received
the prior year.
Surprisingly, the sample was unsure about the procedure by which tenure
is achieved. 259 Only a majority of those with a master degree (fifty-one
percent), eleven plus years of experience (fifty-two percent), or a school law
class (fifty-six percent) 260 knew that state law grants a teacher, employed in
a district for two consecutive years outside of Chicago and three years in
Chicago, "contractual continued service" (tenure) unless the board notifies
the teacher of failure to achieve re-employment. 26'
Additionally, the sample was uncertain about precise rights under tenure.
In Smith v. Board of Education of Urbana,26 the court held that physical
education teachers who served as high school coaches and enjoyed tenure as
teachers at the time they were replaced as coaches were not entitled to a
hearing before being replaced. Seventy-four percent of the sample were aware
that tenure rights would not extend to extracurricular positions such as that
254. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
255. See Appendix, Table IV, (L).
256. Id.
257. See Appendix, Table IV, (N). Only thirty-five percent of all respondents, and thirty-
eight percent, thirty-three percent and forty-two percent of administrators, teachers and those
who had a law course, respectively, gave correct answers.
258. 109 Ill. App. 3d 716, 441 N.E.2d 120, 65 Ill. Dec. 328 (1st Dist. 1982).
259. It should be noted that Illinois does not have a "tenure" law. Instead it has a "continued
service law" that applies to teachers. Such a law is considered to be a type of tenure law. See
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-11, 34-54 (1985).
260. See Appendix, Table IV, (0).
261. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 24-Il, 34-54 (1985).
262. 798 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1983).
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of coach. 26 Eighty-eight percent of the educators were aware that a tenured
teacher in a Reduction in Force situation could bump a nontenured teacher
occupying a position for which the tenured teacher was qualified.264 Tenured
teachers do not, however, have the right to bump non-tenured teachers when
the non-tenured teacher is qualified for the job, but the tenured teacher is
not. 265 The number of correct responses to this question was low. 266
Educators also exhibited little awareness of constitutional and statutory
rights concerning unions. An individual's right to form and join a union is
protected by the first amendment.2 67 However, the first amendment does not
require recognition of a bargaining unit. 261 In Illinois, collective bargaining
rights for employees are established by state statute.2 69 When asked whether
collective bargaining was a constitutional right, fifty-two percent of the
sample correctly responded yes.270 Those with a school law course evidenced
equal perplexity on this issue; forty-two percent answered yes, compared to
fifty percent no.27" '
The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act contains an agency shop
provision requiring fair share payments by non-members for the bargaining
process. 72 While mandatory contribution for collective bargaining is per-
missible, contribution mandated for other union activities, specifically polit-
ical activities, is not.273 The Illinois statute also specifically excludes political
contributions. 27 Eighty-five percent of the administrators were cognizant
that non-members did not have to support such activities, compared with
seventy-one percent of the total sample.2"
Finally, the sample was asked two questions dealing with union activities
and termination of school employees. The Illinois Act specifically prohibits
educational employers from "[ijnterfering, restraining, or coercing" em-
263. See Appendix, Table IV, (R). Administrators scored the highest in this area at eighty-
eight percent. A school law class had a marked effect on the number of correct responses,
those with scoring eighty-seven percent, those without, sixty-three percent.
264. See Appendix, Table IV, (S). A school law class significantly increased the number of
correct answers to ninety-nine percent. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12(a) (1985).
265. Higgins v. Board of Educ. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 303, 101 Ill. App. 3d
1003, 428 N.E.2d 1126, 57 Ill. Dec. 446 (3d Dist. 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12(a)
(1985).
266. See Appendix, Table IV, (T). Administrators scored the highest with sixty-five percent.
267. McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
268. Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979).
269. See Educational Labor Relations Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1701-1721 (1985).
270. See Appendix, Table IV, (U).
271. Id.
272. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1711 (1985).
273. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
274. "The amount certified by the exclusive representative shall not include any fees for
contributions related to the election or support of any candidate for public office. Nothing in
this section shall preclude the nonmember employee from making voluntary political contri-
butions in conjunction with his or her fair share payment." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1711.
275. See Appendix, Table IV, (V).
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ployees who are exercising their rights under the Act.27 6 Under such a
provision, teachers may not be terminated for carrying out valid union
activities, a fact which the majority of the sample knew.177 Termination of
employment, however, is allowed for participation in an illegal strike. 271
Educators were less certain about this issue, with only sixty-two percent of
the total sample answering correctly. 7 9 Seventy-three percent of those with
a school law course had the correct response, compared to only fifty percent
of those without a school law class. 280
The sample also appeared to be uninformed about the contents of their
contracts for employment. A teacher's contract must be ratified by the
school board to be legally binding.m Seventy-eight percent of the sample
correctly responded on this point.28 2 Sixty-four percent of the sample stated
incorrectly that a school board, under certain circumstances, could break a
teacher's contract. 28 3 The courts assume that contracts are entered into in
accordance with state statutes. To waive a certain section or sections of the
law is illegal-a breach of contract. For example, a board may not rescind
its contract in order to remove a teacher from his position without first
following the statutes governing the contract, which include presentation of
charges, a hearing, and dismissal for certain enumerated causes only.28 4
Fifty percent of administrators and fifty-four percent of those who had a
school law class had the highest frequency of correct responses regarding
liquidated damages for teachers who break their contracts and quit their
jobs. 28 5 Until 1984, a school board could bring a breach of contract action
against a teacher who resigned during the school year for four percent of
his salary as liquidated damages. 86 A recent amendment now permits teachers
to resign "at any time by obtaining concurrence of the board or by serving
a 30 day notice upon the secretary of the board. ' 28 7 However, the teacher
276. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 1714(a)(1) (1985). See also Columbus Educ. Assoc. v.
Columbus City School Dist., 623 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1980); Nigosian v. Weiss, 343 F. Supp.
757 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
277. A number of categories scored eighty percent or higher on this question: masters degree-
eighty-nine percent; six to ten years experience-eighty-nine percent; eleven or more years-
eighty-two percent; school law course-ninety-two percent; teachers-eighty percent; adminis-
trators-eighty-eight percent. See Appendix, Table IV, (W).
278. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Assoc., 426 U.S. 482 (1976)
(due process clause did not guarantee hearing by body other than school board).
279. See Appendix, Table IV, (X).
280. Id.
281. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.7 (board appoints teachers and fixes their salaries).
See also Muehle v. School Dist. No. 38, 344 Ill. App. 365, 100 N.E.2d 805 (1951).
282. See Appendix, Table IV, (Y).
283. See Appendix, Table IV, (AA).
284. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-12 (1985).
285. See Appendix, Table IV, (BB).
286. Arduini v. Board of Educ. of Pontiac Township High School, Dist. 90, 92 111. 2d 72,
440 N.E.2d 848, 64 Ill. Dec. 936 (1982).
287. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-14 (1985).
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may not resign during the school year without the concurrence of the board.288
School districts with populations under 500,000 may not implement resi-
dency requirements for teacher employment.28 9 The majority of the sample
(fifty-five percent) was aware of this statute.2" However, this probably
reflects the fact that the respondents were Chicago and suburban Chicago
employees.
4. Teachers' Supervision of Students
The sample seemed to be unaware of their responsibilities regarding the
supervision of students. Only twenty-five percent of the administrators,
twenty-six percent of the teachers, and twenty-nine percent of those who
had had a school law course were aware that school officials can exercise
authority over students for their out-of-school conduct, where that conduct
had a direct effect on the general welfare of the school. 291 The misbehavior
included fighting after school, insulting teachers, or harassing students on
the way home from school.2 92 Teachers, however, are not required to provide
constant supervision over their students. In a Chicago case, Mancha v. Field
Museum of Natural History,293 the court ruled it would be practically im-
possible to require a teacher to watch each student at all times.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the survey findings reveals that the educators surveyed had
a moderate to poor understanding of school law. Educators scored above
seventy percent on only twenty of the one hundred survey questions. A
school law course, however, improved the level of responses on almost every
question. Administrators also faired better on most questions.
Generally, educators responded correctly to questions on constitutional
issues involving church/state relations and civil rights. Within this category,
administrators had the highest scores on five of the questions. A school law
course improved responses on all but one question, and improved responses
by twenty percent or more on two questions. Surprisingly, educators with
the lowest level of experience had higher scores in this area.
Educators were less sure, however, about Illinois law. They exhibited little
awareness of provisions in the Illinois School Code governing strikes, pro-
cedures for teacher termination, and student truancy and disciplinary meas-
288. Id.
289. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-4.1 (1984). Chicago's population exceeds 500,000, so the
city does have a residency requirement.
290. See Appendix, Table IV, (DD).
291. See Appendix, Table IV, (FF).
292. Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
293. 5 Ill. App. 3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (Ist Dist. 1972). See also supra notes 114-43 and
accompanying text.
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ures. Administrators and those with a school law course faired the best on
issues governing teacher employment. A school law course produced the
highest score on four of the five questions concerning student disciplinary
procedures. The survey sample had the most problems with issues involving
Illinois tort law, specifically liability for negligence and malpractice. Again
administrators had the highest score on most of the questions, but a school
law course also improved response levels.
Educators were fairly knowledgeable regarding students' rights, parental
rights and school policy. Administrators and respondents with a school law
course each had the highest scores on eight questions. Those surveyed with
a masters degree faired best on three questions. The sample was particularly
unsure about censorship of student publications and access to student rec-
ords.
Surprisingly, the sample was unsure about a number of issues concerning
teachers' rights directly affecting themselves. These issues included teacher
dress codes, rights to collective bargaining, teaching controversial issues,
procedural rights in employment, and supervision of students. Educators
with a school law course answered correctly with the highest score on twelve
of the questions. On eight of these questions, a school law course improved
responses by twenty percent or more. Administrators scored highest on eight
questions.
The results of this study indicate that there is a definite need for more in-
service training in school law. It also shows that educators profit from a
legal education. The dispensing of information on school law should begin
in teacher preparation programs, continue in programs preparing school
administrators, and become a regular part of in-service programs for school
personnel at all levels. Educators should be concerned with preventive school
law. It will apprise them of the parameters of their responsibilities and the
limitations on their actions.
1985]
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